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Texas courts continue to dissect procedural issues that franchisors often
face during litigation, and this Survey period produced some important
reminders for franchisors to consider as they negotiate franchise agree-
ments. Other Texas cases during this Survey period should prompt
franchisors to remain diligent with protection of their intellectual prop-
erty as well as provide valuable insight on the evidentiary requirements of
frequently litigated franchising issues, including various common law and
statutory claims unique to the franchising model.
II. PROCEDURE
A. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In Jani-King Franchising, Inc. v. Falco Franchising, S.A.,1 the Dallas
Court of Appeals analyzed whether the state district court had personal
jurisdiction over a foreign franchisee, its branch manager, and its
shareholders.
Falco, a Belgium-based company, and its principals approached Jani-
King, a Texas corporation and franchisor of commercial cleaning services,
about acquiring rights to a Jani-King franchise in Belgium. “Jani-King
and Falco entered into a Regional Franchise Agreement . . . . The Agree-
ment granted Falco an exclusive right to operate a Jani-King regional
franchise in Belgium for an initial term of 20 years in exchange for . . .
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Associate, Haynes and Boone, LLP, Dallas, Texas.
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1. No. 05-15-00335-CV, 2016 WL 2609314, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 5, 2016, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
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certain fees and royalties.”2 After Falco fell behind on its payments to
Jani-King, defaulted on reporting obligations, and noticed its intent to
terminate the franchise agreement, Jani-King discovered that Falco had
established a competing business and misused Jani-King’s confidential in-
formation.3 Jani-King sued Falco and its principals for fraud and other
torts, alleging that they had “misrepresented the causes for Falco’s poor
performance, misrepresented revenue from sales, led Jani-King to believe
Falco was dedicated to the relationship when it was not, and concealed
the fact that they were violating the non-compete agreement.”4 The al-
leged misrepresentations by Falco’s principals occurred during meetings
they attended in Texas and by written communication with Jani-King. The
alleged misrepresentations by Falco’s branch manager—the transmission
of incomplete and inaccurate reporting—occurred via e-mail to Jani-
King.5
Falco and its principals entered a special appearance to dispute per-
sonal jurisdiction.6 The trial court granted all of the individual special ap-
pearances but denied Falco’s special appearance.7 The question of
jurisdiction was addressed on interlocutory appeal by the court of
appeals.
The appellate court first held that the fiduciary-shield doctrine did not
protect the individuals from the court’s jurisdiction because the individu-
als’ acts were tortious acts for which they could be personally liable.8 The
court then analyzed the individuals’ contacts with Texas in order to deter-
mine whether the court could assert specific personal jurisdiction.9 The
court found that Falco’s branch manager lacked sufficient contacts to sup-
port personal jurisdiction because “communications through telephone
and email regarding negotiation and performance of a contract between
[a] Texas plaintiff[ ] and [ ] foreign defendant[s] were not meaningful con-
tacts of the foreign defendant with Texas.”10 However, because the other
principals made fraudulent statements and omissions while present in
Texas regarding the franchise’s performance, payment assurances, and
competing enterprise (which were core to Jani-King’s claims), the court
found that Jani-King alleged sufficient facts to support personal jurisdic-
tion as to Falco’s principals.11
Finally, the court of appeals confirmed that Texas courts had personal
jurisdiction over Falco.12 Of particular significance, the court noted that
2. Id.






9. Id. at *3.
10. Id. at *4 (citing KC Smash 01, LLC v. Gerdes, Hendrichson, Ltd., L.L.P., 384
S.W.3d 389, 393–94 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.)).
11. Id. at *4–6.
12. Id. at *8.
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Falco purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in
Texas because (1) Falco’s representatives “negotiated and entered into
the Agreement which contemplated systematic and continuing contacts
with Jani-King in Texas over a twenty [ ] year period”; (2) “Falco agreed
to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts”; (3) “Falco performed tasks under the
contract [in] Texas”—e.g., training, meetings, payments; and (4) Falco
“agreed to apply Texas law to any dispute with Jani-King[.]”13 Similar to
its analysis of jurisdiction with respect to Falco’s principals, the court de-
termined that the claims were substantially related to Falco’s contacts and
that jurisdiction over Falco comported with traditional notions of fair play
and justice.14
Jani-King shows Texas courts’ consistent application of the Texas long-
arm statute and their willingness to protect franchisors or franchisees
against foreign parties who have reaped the benefits of doing business in
Texas and invoked the protections afforded by Texas law.
B. FORUM SELECTION
Appliance Alliance, LLC v. Sears Home Appliance Showrooms, LLC15
demonstrates Texas courts’ continued willingness to enforce forum-selec-
tion clauses in franchise agreements. A former franchisee and its owners
sued Sears for wrongful termination, breach of contract, and “numerous
[other] state law torts, including defamation, conversion, trespass, and
tortious interference” regarding the parties’ franchise relationship and
Sears’s repossession of the plaintiffs’ franchise locations.16 Sears removed
the case from state to federal court and then filed a motion to transfer
venue based on the forum-selection clause contained in the various
agreements governing the parties’ business relationship, which required
litigation in Illinois.17 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas granted Sears’s motion to transfer the case to Illinois.18 In doing so,
the district court noted that the forum-selection clauses in the parties’
agreements supported transfer and that such clauses “should be given
controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases.”19 This ruling is
important because it confirms that franchisors should be able to enforce
forum-selection clauses in their franchise agreements.20
In Rainbow International LLC v. Scruggs, the parties entered into two
agreements: the Termination Agreement (executed May 31, 2007) and
13. Id. at *7–8.
14. Id.
15. No. 3:15-cv-01707-M, 2015 WL 9319179, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2015). Haynes
Boone attorneys Deborah S. Coldwell and Jamee M. Cotton represented Sears in this
matter.
16. Id.
17. Id. at *1, *8.
18. Id. at *8.
19. Id. (quoting Saye v. First Specialty Ins. Co., No. 3:14-CV-202-M, 2014 WL 1386565,
at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2014)).
20. See id.
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the Settlement Agreement (executed September 1, 2009).21 “At issue
[was] whether a Termination Agreement provision titled ‘Applicable
Law, Jurisdiction, and Venue’ remain[ed] in force in light of the [subse-
quent] Settlement Agreement[.]”22
Rainbow alleged claims for “breach of contract, federal and common
law service mark infringement, federal unfair competition and false desig-
nation of origin, unfair trade practices, and common law unfair competi-
tion.”23 Scruggs asserted that the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Texas “should dismiss the case because it lack[ed] personal
jurisdiction, venue [was] improper, and forum non conveniens should be
exercised.”24
Scruggs argued that “the Settlement Agreement, which [did] not con-
tain any choice of law, venue, or forum provision akin to the Termination
Agreement, superseded the Termination Agreement.”25 The district court
disagreed and found that the Settlement Agreement did not supersede
the Termination Agreement; therefore, the Applicable Law, Jurisdiction,
and Venue provision contained within the Termination Agreement was
valid and enforceable.26 The Termination Agreement specifically stated
that it could only be amended “by written instrument designated as an
amendment to [the] Termination Agreement and executed by all of the
parties.”27 Neither party disputed that “the Settlement Agreement . . .
[was] not designated as an amendment to the Termination Agreement.”28
The district court noted that if Scruggs had “intended for the Settlement
Agreement to supersede the entirety of the Termination Agreement, then
the Settlement Agreement should have contained a clause” making that
designation.29 Instead, “the Settlement Agreement was drafted to specifi-
cally address alleged breaches of the Termination Agreement[—not] as a
full replacement of the Termination Agreement.”30 The district court also
found that venue was proper because Rainbow had satisfied the require-
ments of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).31
Finally, the district court found that the defendants had not met their
burden under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.32 First, Scruggs
“failed to explain what specific court should be the alternate forum. Sec-
ond, each case that [Scruggs] cited in which the court granted dismissal
based on forum non conveniens grounds involved a foreign court as the
21. Rainbow Int’l LLC v. Scruggs, No. W:15-CV-162, 2015 WL 11622491, at *1 (W.D.









30. Id. at *4.
31. Id. at *4–5.
32. Id. at *5–6.
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proposed alternative forum.”33 In this case, the district court noted that
there was no evidence that Scruggs was “seeking to have any court
outside of South Carolina serve as the forum in this case.”34 The district
court also noted,
The applicable case law strongly suggest[ed] that forum non con-
veniens is reserved exclusively for cases in which the proposed alter-
native forum is a judicial body located outside of the United States.
Only in exceptional circumstances (which [did] not apply here) might
forum non conveniens require dismissal of a case so that it can be
subsequently filed in a state court.35
Accordingly, the district court denied Scruggs’s motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction and improper venue.36
The Rainbow case reflects the importance of careful drafting as it re-
lates to subsequent agreements. In particular, a subsequent agreement
should specifically address which provisions of any prior agreements it is
replacing and state that the subsequent agreement is entirely replacing
any prior agreements between the parties.
C. ARBITRATION AND CLASS ACTIONS
Franchisors often directly own and operate restaurants within their
franchise systems. Unsurprisingly, franchisors—alongside their franchis-
ees—are at risk for class action lawsuits associated with the operation of
their corporate-owned franchises. The following case illustrates how care-
fully and consistently incorporating arbitration provisions into employ-
ment agreements could prevent conditional class certification.
Mexican Restaurants, Inc. (MRI), the franchisor of Casa Ole´ Mexican
restaurants, recently faced a potential class action lawsuit for alleged ille-
gal compensation practices at its corporate-owned franchise stores.37 In
White v. Turner, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas
addressed the arbitrability of the employees’ claims as well as the class
certification issues associated therewith.38 Although sued alongside one
of its franchisees, the district court noted that the franchisor and fran-
chisee were not joint employers of the employees who were working
solely at the franchisee’s locations, and the district court addressed the
claims against MRI separately.39
33. Id. at *6 (internal citation omitted).
34. Id.
35. Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Amini Innovation Corp. v. Bank & Estate
Liquidators, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1042 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (“Only when the more conve-
nient forum is a foreign country can a suit brought in a proper federal venue be dismissed
on grounds of forum non conveniens.”) (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orle-
ans, 821 F.2d 1147, 1159 n.15 (5th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc. v. Lopez, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989))).
36. Id.
37. White v. Turner, No. H-15-1485, 2016 WL 1090107, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2016).
38. Id. at *1–2.
39. Id. at *2.
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MRI filed a motion to compel arbitration based on its written agree-
ments with its employees “requiring arbitration of all employment-re-
lated disputes with MRI,” including claims arising under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.40 Although only one of the two employees involved pro-
duced a signed, written agreement evidencing the arbitration provision at
issue, the district court considered evidence presented by MRI “that dur-
ing the relevant period, [MRI] . . . required every employee and prospec-
tive employee to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of
employment.”41 However, due to the franchisor’s document-retention
policy, the personnel files for the employee at issue had been destroyed.42
In its analysis, the district court noted,
Although the [Federal Arbitration Act] requires a written agreement
to arbitrate if the agreement existed but cannot be produced because
it [was] lost or destroyed, a court may still enforce it and compel
arbitration if the moving party can show its contents and that it was
not lost or destroyed in bad faith.43
Because the employee did not dispute the existence of the agree-
ment—i.e., made no unequivocal denial—the district court found “[t]he
existence, content, and enforceability of the agreement between [the em-
ployee] and MRI [was] not in issue.”44 The district court found that the
employees entered into valid arbitration agreements covering all claims
against MRI.45 Consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act’s mandate to
enforce valid arbitration agreements, the district court granted MRI’s
motion to compel arbitration and dismissed all claims against MRI with-
out prejudice in favor of arbitration.46
Still remaining, however, was the employees’ motion for conditional
class certification. The employees argued that the district court should
conditionally certify a collective action because some of the employees
may have state law defenses as to the validity of the arbitration agree-
ments.47 The district court rejected the employees’ argument and denied
conditional certification because the claims of the representative plain-
tiffs were dismissed, and the request was therefore moot.48
The White case demonstrates the importance of consistently applying
and maintaining records reflecting the terms under which franchisors
wish to operate—especially in the alternative dispute context. A well-
drafted arbitration clause including limitations on class actions or collec-
40. Id. at *1.
41. Id. at *3–4.
42. Id.
43. Id. at *3 (internal citation omitted) (citing FED. R. EVID. 1004; TEX. R. EVID. 1004;
Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Vacuum Tanks, Inc., 975 F.2d 1130, 1132 (5th Cir. 1992)).
44. Id. at *3–4.
45. Id.
46. Id. at *2–4.
47. Id. at *4.
48. Id. at *4–5.
2017] Franchise Law 189
tive actions may result in less overall litigation and more manageable con-
flict resolution.
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TRADEMARKS
In Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. Frontier Hotels, Inc., the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted Choice Hotels’
motion for summary judgment, finding that a former Choice Hotels fran-
chisee continued to use Choice Hotels’ trademarks after termination of
their franchise agreement.49
“Choice Hotels offers hotel and motel services through several well-
known brands such as CAMBRIA SUITES®, COMFORT INN®, COM-
FORT SUITES®, SLEEP INN®, and RODEWAY INN®. Choice Hotels
owns approximately twenty-four [ ] different trademark registrations re-
lated to the ‘COMFORT’ family of marks.”50 Choice Hotels entered into
a franchise agreement with franchisee Frontier, who was required to pro-
vide certain fees and monthly financial data to Choice Hotels.51 After
notices of default went unheeded by Frontier, Choice Hotels sent a notice
of termination and demanded that Frontier cease using Choice Hotels’
registered trademarks.52 “Section eleven (11) of the [franchise] agree-
ment stat[ed] that upon termination, the former franchisees must
‘[i]mmediately discontinue any and all use of our Intellectual Property
[and] refrain from using the Brand Marks to identify the Hotel . . . .’”53
“After the termination of the franchise agreement, Choice Hotels
learned that [Frontier]” was still using Choice Hotels’ trademarks and
“Choice Hotels received a customer complaint . . . regarding [Frontier’s]
hotel.”54 The guest complained “that she had a poor experience at the
hotel and had been unable to log the complaint on Choice Hotels’ web-
site. Choice Hotels advised the customer that this was because [Fron-
tier’s] franchise agreement had been terminated.”55 Thereafter, “Choice
Hotels sent [Frontier] written notice advising them to cease and desist
with the use of all COMFORT INN® marks,” but photographs taken in
subsequent months showed that Frontier continued to use Choice Hotels’
trademarks on the hotel’s exterior and internet advertisements.56 Choice
Hotels sued Frontier for violations of the Lanham Act and false designa-
tion of origin, as well as Texas common law trademark infringement, and
Texas common law unfair competition. Choice Hotels moved for sum-
mary judgment.57
49. Choice Hotels Int’l v. Frontier Hotels, Inc., No. H-15-2355, 2016 WL 4367993, at
*3–4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2016).





55. Id. (internal citation omitted).
56. Id. at *2.
57. Id. Frontier failed to respond to the motion for summary judgment, so the motion
was unopposed.
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The district court began its analysis by noting that its determination of
whether Frontier was “liable to Choice Hotels for trademark infringe-
ment and false designation of origin pursuant to the Lanham Act as well
as for trademark infringement and unfair competition pursuant to Texas
Common Law” required only a single inquiry “because the facts that sup-
port a claim for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act also sup-
port a claim for false designation of origin under the Lanham Act.”58
The district court considered whether Choice Hotels had satisfied the
elements of a Lanham Act claim, which first requires a legally protected
mark, and then that
a person “uses (1) any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a mark; (2) without the registrant’s consent; (3) in com-
merce; (4) in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution,
or advertising of any goods; (5) where such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake or to deceive.”59
The district court found that “Choice Hotels [had] submitted unop-
posed evidence that it legally owned the COMFORT INN® family of
marks”; that the record clearly showed Frontier “continued to use Choice
Hotels’ legally protected COMFORT INN® trademarks long after the
termination of the franchise agreement as well as the . . . cease and desist
letter”; and that Frontier’s “use of the marks was clearly in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, and advertising of services[—the] evidence
show[ed] visible COMFORT INN® marks in a photo uploaded by [Fron-
tier] to a hotel booking site advertising the property.”60 Finally, the dis-
trict court found that there was “uncontested evidence in the record of
actual consumer confusion” due to the customer’s complaint.61 Accord-
ingly, there was uncontested evidence that there was “no genuine issue of
material fact regarding [Frontier’s] engagement in trademark infringe-
ment against Choice Hotels” and the court granted Choice Hotels’ mo-
tion for summary judgment.62
This case serves as a good reminder to franchisors to diligently protect
their trademarks. For example, franchisors should follow up with fran-
chisees after termination to ensure that they are no longer using their
protected trademarks, and take appropriate action if needed.
IV. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
A. FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
Franchisees’ tort-based claims for fraud, fraudulent inducement, and
negligent misrepresentation often face challenges from franchisors at the
58. Id. at *3 (citing Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Patel, 940 F. Supp. 2d 532, 538 (S.D.
Tex. 2013); Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Lee, 547 F. Supp. 2d 667, 674 (W.D. Tex. 2008)).
59. Id. (quoting Am. Rice, Inc. v. Producers Rice Mill, Inc., 518 F.3d 321, 329 (5th Cir.
2008)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at *4.
62. Id.
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motion to dismiss and summary judgment phases that these claims are
barred by the economic loss rule or that franchisees have no evidence of
any false statements or material omissions. A yogurt franchisee faced
such arguments and ultimately had its tort claims dismissed by the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Texas.63 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered and upheld the district court’s
dismissal of the franchisee’s tort-based claims in Yumilicious Franchise,
L.L.C. v. Barrie.64 After Yumilicious brought an action against fran-
chisee-defendants for breaches of two franchise agreements, the franchis-
ees counterclaimed that Yumilicious fraudulently induced them to enter
into the two franchise agreements and asserted claims for fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, and fraudulent inducement, among others.65 The dis-
trict court summarily dismissed these counterclaims, which the Fifth Cir-
cuit upheld.66
First, as to the negligent misrepresentation claim, the Fifth Circuit up-
held the district court’s determination that this claim “failed in part be-
cause [there was] no evidence that Yumilicious’s actions caused injury
and in part because [the claim] was barred by the economic loss rule.”67
The Fifth Circuit explained that the economic loss rule “generally pre-
cludes recovery in tort for economic losses resulting from the failure of a
party to perform under a contract.”68 As such, “the rule restricts con-
tracting parties to contractual remedies for those economic losses associ-
ated with the relationship, even when the breach might reasonably be
viewed as a consequence of a contracting party’s negligence.”69 The Fifth
Circuit rejected the franchisees’ argument that Formosa Plastics Corp.
USA v. Presidio Engineers and Contractors, Inc.,70 which exempts “the
independent injury requirement for fraudulent inducement claims,” pro-
tected the negligent misrepresentation claim from the application of the
economic loss rule.71 In affirming the lower court, the Fifth Circuit ex-
plained that the franchisees’ argument fails since Formosa’s “rejection of
the independent injury requirement in fraudulent inducement claims
does not extend to claims for negligent misrepresentation or negligent
inducement.”72
63. Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C. v. Barrie (Yumilicious I), No. 3:13-CV-4841-L, 2015
WL 1856729, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2015), aff’d, 819 F.3d 170 (5th Cir. 2016).
Yumilicious I was discussed at length in the 2016 edition of the SMU Annual Texas Survey.
See Deborah S. Coldwell, et al., Franchise Law, 2 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 159, 173–76
(2016).
64. (Yumilicious II), 819 F.3d 170 (5th Cir. 2016).
65. Id. at 173.
66. Id. at 173–74.
67. Id. at 177.
68. Id. at 177–78 (quoting Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d
1, 12 (Tex. 2007)).
69. Id. at 178 (quoting Lamar Homes, 242 S.W.3d at 12–13).
70. 960 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1998) (rejecting the independent injury requirement for fraud-
ulent inducement claims).
71. Yumilicious II, 819 F.3d at 178.
72. Id. (quoting D.S.A., Inc. v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 973 S.W.2d 662, 663 (Tex.
1998) (per curiam)).
192 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 3
As to the fraudulent inducement claim, to which the economic loss rule
is inapplicable under Formosa, the Fifth Circuit upheld dismissal of the
claim on evidentiary grounds and also looked to the disclaimer of reliance
as an additional ground to defeat the fraud-based claims.73 In affirming
the dismissal of the fraudulent inducement claim, the Fifth Circuit agreed
that the franchisees failed to “introduce[ ] any evidence that Yumilicious
made false statements or material omissions.”74 Stressing that
“[p]leadings are not summary judgment evidence,”75 the Fifth Circuit de-
termined that “[w]ithout affidavits, declarations, . . . or some other con-
crete evidence concerning” the alleged false statements or material
omissions, no triable issue of fact existed on the franchisee’s fraudulent
inducement claims.76 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit found that “[e]ven if
[the franchisee] had introduced evidence showing a triable issue of fact”
on the issue of whether misleading statements or omissions occurred, the
fraudulent inducement claim still failed because “the franchise agreement
contain[ed] an explicit clause . . . disclaim[ing] reliance on any express or
implied statements about potential volume, profits, or success of the
business.”77
The Fifth Circuit noted that “[u]nder Texas law, a statement disclaim-
ing reliance is sufficient to waive fraud-based claims.”78 Thus, although
the district court had not considered Yumilicious’s argument that the
franchise agreement’s disclaimer of reliance waived representations
outside the franchise disclosure document, the Fifth Circuit cited contrac-
tual waiver-of-reliance provisions in the franchise agreement as an addi-
tional basis for upholding the dismissal of the fraudulent inducement
claims.79
Yumilicious II is a useful reminder that, while the economic loss rule is
not applied to fraudulent inducement claims, this rule can defeat misrep-
resentation-based claims for a party’s failure to perform under a contract.
In addition, Yumilicious II reiterates the requirement that the party with
the burden of proof must provide concrete evidence of the false state-
ments or omissions at the summary judgment phase. Finally, Yumilicious
II indicates a willingness by courts to enforce a properly drafted waiver-
of-reliance clause that expressly disclaims the alleged misstatements at
issue. However, whether the alleged misstatements are expressly dis-
claimed, and therefore contradict the terms of the franchise agreement, is
often not clear cut, as was the situation in the next case—Mercedes-Benz
USA, LLC v. Carduco, Inc.80
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Wallace v. Tex. Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996)).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 181 (Tex. 1997)).
79. Id.
80. No. 13-13-00296-CV, 2016 WL 1274535, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 31,
2016) (mem. op.), set aside, opinion not vacated, No. 13-13-00296-CV, 2016 WL 4939377
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Sept. 15, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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Carduco also involved a disclaimer-of-reliance provision, but with dif-
ferent results. In this case, a jury found the automobile franchisor, Merce-
des-Benz, and its employees liable for fraudulent inducement, and it also
found the employees liable for negligent misrepresentation.81 The Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals upheld the jury’s findings of fraudulent induce-
ment and negligent misrepresentation based on Mercedes-Benz’s misrep-
resentation that a purchaser of an automobile franchise could relocate to
McAllen, Texas, and Mercedes-Benz’s failure to disclose to the purchaser
its intent to allow the addition of a new dealership in the McAllen area.82
Plaintiff Carduco, Inc. purchased the assets of his son’s existing Harlingen
Mercedes-Benz dealership with the intent to move the dealership to
McAllen.83 Evidence was presented that Mercedes-Benz had approved
the previous dealership’s relocation to McAllen and that Mercedes-Benz
was aware that Carduco intended to relocate to McAllen.84 At around
the same time, Mercedes-Benz allegedly entered into negotiations with
another dealer to open up an exclusive dealership in the McAllen area,
and Carduco’s official request to relocate to McAllen was denied.85 Mer-
cedes-Benz also failed to preserve emails from potential witnesses once it
became aware of possible litigation, so the jury was given a spoliation
instruction.86
After reviewing the evidence, the court of appeals determined that rea-
sonable jurors could have found that Mercedes-Benz intentionally did not
inform Carduco about Mercedes-Benz’s approval of the new dealership
in the McAllen region, that the region could only support one dealership,
that opening a new dealership in the McAllen area would have a negative
effect on Carduco’s business, and that Mercedes-Benz intentionally reas-
signed affluent demographic areas to the new McAllen dealership.87 Re-
lying on Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Editorial Caballero, S.A. de C.V.,88
Mercedes-Benz argued that Carduco’s claims for fraudulent inducement
and negligent misrepresentation failed because Carduco relied on oral
representations that directly contradicted the express terms of the Dealer
Agreement, and therefore were not justified as a matter of law.89 The
court rejected Mercedes-Benz’s argument for a number of reasons. First,
the court determined that the jury could have found that Mercedes-Benz
made representations or non-disclosures that did not directly contradict
the Dealer Agreement, which provided that: (1) Carduco understood that
81. Id. at *3.
82. Id. at *11, *15.
83. Id. at *2.
84. Id. at *10–11.
85. Id. at *2.
86. Id. at *22–23.
87. Id. at *10–12.
88. 202 S.W.3d 250, 258 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied) (“[R]eliance
upon an oral representation that is directly contradicted by the express, unambiguous
terms of a written agreement between the parties is not justified as a matter of law.”)
(quoting DRC Parts & Accessories, L.L.C. v. VM Motori, S.P.A., 112 S.W.3d 854, 858
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (en banc)).
89. Carduco, 2016 WL 1274535, at *3.
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he did not have an exclusive right to sell in his area; and (2) Carduco had
no right to relocate without approval.90 The court found that the jury
could have found that Mercedes-Benz made other misrepresentations or
non-disclosures that did not contradict the two express terms of the
Dealer Agreement.91 Second, the court also rejected Mercedes-Benz’s ar-
gument that Carduco’s claim was precluded by the disclaimer of reliance,
which stated that: (1) no representations outside of the Dealer Agree-
ment were made by Mercedes-Benz and its agents; and (2) Carduco did
not rely on any extra-contractual representations.92 The court found that
Mercedes-Benz had not shown “a clear and unequivocal disclaimer-of-
reliance clause.”93 Moreover, the asset purchase agreement between
Carduco and the prior owner of the dealership, which was separate from
the Dealer Agreement between Carduco and Mercedes-Benz, “[did] not
contain a disclaimer of reliance.”94 Furthermore, the court found that
there was “no evidence that the disclaimer of reliance . . . was negotiated,
and it [was admittedly] boilerplate,” which weighed “in favor of
Carduco’s claim that the disclaimer [was] not binding.”95 In addition, the
court explained that under Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential
Insurance Co. of America, “a disclaimer of reliance . . . negat[ed] the ele-
ment of reliance in a suit for fraudulent inducement only if the parties
disclaimed reliance on representations about a specific matter in dis-
pute.”96 Here, the court found, “there [was] no evidence that Carduco’s
move to McAllen or that the [new dealership] deal was in dispute at the
time the parties entered into the [Dealer Agreement].”97 Finally, the
court rejected Mercedes-Benz’s argument that it had “no duty to disclose
. . . [because] no confidential or fiduciary relationship[ ]” existed between
the parties.98 The court explained the circumstances giving rise to a duty
to disclose in arms-length transactions:
[W]hen: (1) “one voluntarily discloses information, he has a duty to
disclose the whole truth”; (2) “one makes a representation, he has a
duty to disclose new information when the new information makes
the earlier representation misleading or untrue”; (3) “one makes a
partial disclosure and conveys a false impression, he has a duty to
speak”; and (4) one knows that the other is about to enter into a
contract under a mistake as to undisclosed facts, he has a duty to
disclose facts basic to the transaction if the other party would reason-
ably expect a disclosure of those facts because of the relationship
between the parties, the custom or trade, or other objective
90. Id. at *3, *13–15.
91. Id. at *13–15.
92. Id. at *15.
93. Id. at *15–16.
94. Id. at *16.
95. Id.
96. Id. at *17 (citing Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341
S.W.3d 323, 332 (Tex. 2011)).
97. Id.
98. Id.
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circumstances.99
Here, the court found “a duty to disclose arose in at least one, if not all
[four of these] situations.”100
Waiver-of-reliance provisions have received significant attention in
both state and federal courts in Texas, as they have gained popularity in
franchise agreements. Because reliance is a necessary element of fraud,
these disclaimers are meant to preclude fraudulent inducement and fraud
claims. Although such disclaimers can be enforceable, as evidenced by
Yumilicious II, whether these disclaimers will be enforced can be difficult
to predict, as evidenced by Carduco. This is because determining whether
the alleged misrepresentation directly contradicts the express terms of a
franchise agreement depends on how the alleged misrepresentations are
defined.
B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
The vicarious liability of a franchisor often depends upon the finding of
an agency relationship between franchisor and franchisee. Agency rela-
tionships that can impose vicarious liability can be either actual or appar-
ent. While actual agency is generally found if a franchisor has actual
control over the instrumentality that causes harm, apparent agency can
be found if the franchisor (putative principal) represents that the fran-
chisee (putative agent) is in fact the franchisor’s agent. Thus, it is the acts
of the franchisor, and not the franchisee’s acts, that determine whether
vicarious liability based on apparent agency exists. The following two
cases considered apparent agency arguments.
In Barragan v. General Motors LLC,101 the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Texas considered when a franchisor’s argument re-
garding the existence of an apparent agency relationship between
franchisor and franchisee could be considered. In this case, a driver and
her brother were killed when the driver lost control of the General Mo-
tors (GM) vehicle she was driving with its attached U-Haul trailer.102 The
next friend to the minor children of the decedent sued GM and U-Haul,
asserting various claims including manufacturing defect, negligence, and
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.103 U-Haul moved to
dismiss the breach of implied warranty of merchantability claim asserted
against it because the complaint alleged that the U-Haul trailer was
rented from defendant Kelton’s Inc. and not from U-Haul.104 Denying
the motion to dismiss as to the breach of implied warranty of
merchantability claim against U-Haul, the district court stated that the
99. Id. (quoting Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Editorial Caballero, S.A. de C.V., 202 S.W.3d
250, 260 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied)).
100. Id.
101. No. SA-15-CV-854-DAE, 2016 WL 3519675 (W.D. Tex. June 22, 2016).
102. Id. at *1.
103. Id. at *1–2.
104. Id. at *8.
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complaint asserted “that Kelton’s [was] a franchise dealer for U-Haul.”105
As such, the district court determined that whether potential vicarious
liability for breach of merchantability fell on U-Haul was an issue of
agency.106 Because “at the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiffs need not
have determined the party on whom liability ultimately falls,” the district
court denied U-Haul’s motion to dismiss.107 The district court could
therefore presumably consider the agency issue at summary judgment.
In Won Kyu Kye v. New Star Realty, Inc.,108 the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals considered the agency issue at the summary judgment stage. In this
case, Plaintiff Kye “was in California and saw [a newspaper] advertise-
ment . . . [that] offer[ed] three retail alcohol stores in Texas for sale.”109
Kye then “contacted the broker, . . . [who was with defendant] New Star
Realty, Inc., to inquire about the stores.”110 The broker explained that
the areas around the stores were “dry,” meaning that alcohol could not
be sold, so “residents of the adjacent ‘dry’ areas would drive to the
stores—which were in a ‘wet’ area—to purchase alcohol.”111 Plaintiff tes-
tified that the broker “guaranteed that the surrounding ‘dry’ areas adja-
cent to the [stores] would stay ‘dry’ forever” and this was why the stores
are so profitable.112 Plaintiff purchased the three stores.113 “Within a year
of his purchase, voters . . . chang[ed] the areas surrounding the stores
from ‘dry’ to ‘wet’ . . . . [A]s a result, the stores experienced a significant
decrease in revenues and eventually closed,” and Plaintiff sued several
defendants, including New Star Realty.114 Plaintiff’s claims against New
Star Realty were based on the apparent authority of the individual broker
to represent on behalf of New Star Realty that the local laws regarding
the designation of “‘wet’ and ‘dry’ areas would never change.”115
After the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the broker-
age firm based on a finding that no apparent agency existed, Plaintiff Kye
appealed. In upholding summary judgment in favor of the brokerage
firm, the court of appeals determined that Kye’s evidence, even if true,
did not establish apparent authority.116 First, the court explained that to
determine whether apparent authority exists, only the acts of the princi-
pal—here the brokerage firm—are relevant.117 The court explained that
apparent authority arises if the principal knowingly allows an agent to
represent that it has authority or if the principal negligently allows the
105. Id. at *9.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. No. 05-15-00110-CV, 2016 WL 3523683 (Tex. App.—Dallas, June 27, 2016, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
109. Id. at *1.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *2.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *3–4.
116. Id. at *5–6.
117. Id. at *3.
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agent to represent that it has authority, and the plaintiff justifiably relies
on the representations.118 As such, apparent authority is based on the
principal’s acts and “is limited to the scope of responsibility that is appar-
ently authorized.”119
Here, Kye’s evidence related to acts of the broker (the purported
agent) and not to New Star Realty (the purported principal)—i.e., the
contents of the broker’s business cards, the broker’s statement that he
was vice president of New Star Realty, the broker’s use of documents
with the New Star Realty corporate logo, and the broker’s use of docu-
ments identifying both the broker and New Star Realty as the broker.120
Nor did the complained-of acts of New Star Realty support Kye’s claim
of apparent authority.121 The court explained that to raise a fact issue,
Kye would have to provide evidence that New Star Realty “clothed [the
broker] with the indicia of authority, leading a reasonably prudent person
to believe that [the broker] had the authority to make [the] statement on
behalf of [New Star Realty]” guaranteeing that the local areas would re-
main dry and that Kye “exercised reasonable diligence . . . to ascertain the
scope of [the broker’s] authority.”122 Here, “evidence that [New Star Re-
alty] identified [the broker] as vice president and referred to the [bro-
ker’s] Dallas office on [the New Star Realty] website did not raise an
issue of fact regarding whether” apparent authority to make the repre-
sentation existed since “[t]he mere appointment of a person as a ‘vice
president’ does not by itself establish apparent authority.”123
As Barragan emphasized, the existence of apparent agency is a ques-
tion of fact. Thus, courts will generally not consider whether an agency
relationship exists between franchisor and franchisee at the pleadings
stage. The Kye case emphasized that Texas courts will evaluate claims for
apparent agency based upon the actions of the franchisor and not those of
the purported-agent franchisee. Thus, the statements of the franchisee
and use of the franchisor’s logo will generally be insufficient to create
apparent authority.
C. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
Colorado County Oil Co. v. Star Tex Distributors, Inc.124 involved com-
peting “jobbers” for the sale of gasoline to a convenience store. In this
118. Id (citing Gaines v. Kelly, 235 S.W.3d 179, 182 (Tex. 2007)).
119. Id. at *4 (quoting First Valley Bank of Los Fresnos v. Martin, 144 S.W.3d 466, 471
(Tex. 2004)).
120. Id.
121. See id. at *5.
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing Elaazami v. Lawler Foods, Ltd., No. 14-11-00120-CV, 2012 WL 376687,
at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 7, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.)) (“The mere
appointment of a person as a ‘vice president’ does not by itself establish apparent authority
as a matter of law for the person to execute employment contracts on behalf of the
company.”).
124. No. 14-14-00905-CV, 2016 WL 2743452, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
May 10, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op).
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case, Star Tex supplied gasoline to a “Day & Night” convenience store
pursuant to a Dealer Franchise Agreement entered into in 2001, under
which the convenience store agreed to buy Citgo-branded gasoline from
Star Tex for an initial ten-year term, with an automatic renewal “on a
year-to-year basis unless terminated.”125 Starting in 2001, Star Tex pro-
vided Phillips-branded gasoline, although “Day & Night never signed a
written amendment agreeing to accept Phillips-branded gasoline from
Star Tex.”126 However, “Day & Night accepted Star Tex’s gasoline deliv-
eries under the Dealer Franchise Agreement for 10 years without com-
plaint.”127 Prior to the end of the ten-year term, Colorado County Oil
Company (CCO), a competing jobber, negotiated to provide Day &
Night with Valero-branded gasoline and paid the convenience store a
$50,000 signing bonus.128 Star Tex was not notified that the Dealer
Franchise Agreement was terminated, and Star Tex “discovered the
change [in branding] when [it] visited the [Day & Night] store . . . and saw
Valero signage in place.”129
Star Tex then sued Day & Night for breach of contract and the compet-
ing jobber, CCO, “for tortious interference with existing and prospective
contractual relations.”130 After a jury ruled in favor of Star Tex on the
breach of contract and tortious interference claims, Day & Night and
CCO appealed.131 Affirming the jury verdict, the Fourteenth Houston
Court of Appeals first rejected the argument that, because Star Tex sup-
plied Phillips-branded rather than Citgo-branded gasoline, the 2001
Dealer Franchise Agreement no longer existed and therefore could not
be breached by the convenience store or tortiously interfered with by
CCO.132 In doing so, the court of appeals determined that there was sub-
stantial evidence, including ten years of delivery of Phillips-branded gaso-
line without objection by the convenience store, to establish that the
delivery of Phillips-branded gasoline was not a material breach of the
Dealer Franchise Agreement.133 Moreover, the court also determined
that there was sufficient evidence of intentional interference, acts of in-
terference, and proximate cause.134 Even if CCO was told by Day &
Night “that no gasoline supply contract was in place, . . . the jury reasona-
bly could have concluded that the requisite intent, interference, and
causal link were established based on . . . [the] $50,000 signing bonus.”135
125. Id.
126. Id. at *2.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *2–3.
129. Id. at *3.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *4.
132. Id. at *6–8, *10.
133. Id. at *7–8, *10.
134. Id. at *10.
135. Id.
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V. STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES:
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
In the Yumilicious II case, the franchisee asserted counterclaims for,
inter alia, Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) violations based upon:
(1) alleged inaccuracies and omissions in the franchise disclosure docu-
ment (FDD); and (2) statements that the franchise could go national and
“that [the franchisor] was in the process of negotiating a contract with a
national distributor” (but the franchisor ultimately did not consummate
the deal).136 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first ex-
amined the sufficiency of the franchisee’s allegations under Section
17.46(b)(24) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, which “requires
intentional omission of a material fact by a Seller for the purpose of dup-
ing the customer.”137 As to the misstatements in the disclosure document,
the franchisee claimed that the disclosure document “failed to provide
updated disclosures, . . . did not contain disclosures regarding approved
vendors or distributors for required products, . . . underestimated start-up
costs, and . . . included some but not all [of the] financial performance
information previously disclosed.”138 As to the alleged misstatements in
the disclosure documents, the Fifth Circuit noted that the franchisee had
not alleged “that Yumilicious knew any details about the start-up costs,
financial performance, or other items discussed in the FDD that it alleg-
edly failed to disclose.”139 Thus, the Fifth Circuit agreed that there could
be no liability “under the DTPA for [a] failure to disclose facts about
which” Yumilicious was not aware.140 Nor did the statements regarding
going national constitute DTPA violations.141 Because the parties agreed
that Yumilicious was in negotiations to go national, “[t]he failure of those
negotiations [did] not make [them] false.”142 Furthermore, the fran-
chisee’s DTPA claim failed because there were no allegations that the
franchisee was a consumer protected by the DTPA, that the franchisee
relied on information in the FDD, or that the franchisee suffered injury—
which are all required elements under the DTPA.143
The Fifth Circuit also rejected the franchisee’s argument that a techni-
cal violation of the Franchise Rule was sufficient to state a claim under
the DTPA, finding that a technical violation of the Franchise Rule—here
“based on allegedly incomplete disclosure [under] the FDD”—is not suf-
136. Yumilicious Franchise L.L.C. v. Barrie (Yumilicious II), 819 F.3d 170, 174–76 (5th
Cir. 2016).
137. Id. at 175 (quoting Sidco Prods. Mktg., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 858 F.2d 1095, 1100
(5th Cir. 1988)).
138. Id.
139. Id. (footnote omitted).
140. Id. (quoting Robinson v. Preston Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 500, 502
(Tex. 1982)).
141. Id. at 175–76.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 176.
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ficient to state a claim under the DTPA.144 This holding serves as a re-
minder that violations of the Franchise Rule are not enough to establish a
DTPA claim.
B. BANKRUPTCY ISSUES
The In re Landin case explored whether a franchisee’s bankruptcy dis-
charge should be revoked under several provisions of 11 U.S.C.
§ 727(a).145 Defendant franchisee/debtor operated an H&R Block tax
preparation store pursuant to the terms of a franchise agreement.146 Af-
ter Debtor did not cure various alleged breaches of the franchise agree-
ment, H&R Block terminated the franchise agreement and sued the
franchisee, seeking an injunction to enforce the non-compete in the
franchise agreement.147 Debtor then filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and
“the U.S. Trustee commenced [an] adversary proceeding objecting to
[Debtor’s] discharge.”148 “The U.S. Trustee allege[d] that Debtor’s dis-
charge should be revoked under” various provisions of § 727(a), includ-
ing Debtor’s failure to keep and preserve “adequate books and records
for his multiple businesses,” including the H&R Block franchise, and for
Debtor’s failure to account for the loss of millions of dollars in payments
received from H&R Block in the years preceding the filing of the
bankruptcy.149
The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas agreed that
the debtor’s bankruptcy discharge should be revoked based on numerous
false statements and on lack of transparency, including Debtor’s failure to
maintain adequate records of his businesses’ finances.150 In order to es-
tablish a basis for denial of discharge on these grounds under § 727(a)(3),
the Trustee is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the debtor: “(1) failed to keep and preserve financial records; and (2) that
this failure prevented the plaintiff from ascertaining the debtor’s financial
condition.”151 In this case, the evidence established that Debtor “did not
maintain separate business bank accounts” for his franchise, but
“[i]nstead . . . used personal accounts for all his transactions,” including
his H&R Block franchise, “his insurance business, his Blimpie sandwich
store [business], and his personal expenses.”152 In addition, Debtor
“failed to keep any ledgers.”153 In denying the debtor’s discharge, the
bankruptcy court noted that “[a] debtor’s . . . records need not contain
144. Id.
145. Robbins v. Landin (In re Landin), No. 15-50148-CAG, 2016 WL 3049626, at *2
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. May 20, 2016).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at *1.
149. Id. at *2, *5, *10.
150. Id. at *8–9.
151. Id. at *2, *9 (citing Robertson v. Dennis (In re Dennis), 330 F.3d 696, 703 (5th Cir.
2003)).
152. Id. at *5, *9.
153. Id. at *9.
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‘full detail,’ but” should enable “the U.S. Trustee to [be able to] ascertain
[the debtor’s] financial condition.”154 The bankruptcy court rejected
Debtor’s argument that “the documents he turned over—which included
deposits; cancelled checks; and bank statements—[were] sufficient for the
U.S. Trustee to ascertain [his] financial condition.”155 The bankruptcy
court noted that “the adequacy of a debtor’s records is determined on a
case by case basis [by considering] the ‘debtor’s occupation, financial
structure, education, experience, sophistication and any other circum-
stances that should be considered in the interest of justice.’”156 The bank-
ruptcy court determined that none of these factors favored Debtor, who
was “a sophisticated businessman with extensive experience in [running
a] tax preparation [business] . . . [y]et [he] operated all of his businesses
through a single bank account” without using ledgers.157 As such, “the
inadequacy of [the] recordkeeping [was] not justified,” and the bank-
ruptcy court denied discharge on this basis.158
In addition, the bankruptcy court also determined that the discharge
should be denied under § 727(a)(5) for Debtor’s failure to explain “satis-
factorily the loss of assets or deficiency of assets to meet the debtor’s
liabilities.”159 The bankruptcy court agreed with the U.S. Trustee that
Debtor “failed to explain what happened to [the] more than $2.7 million
. . . received from H & R Block from 2012 to 2014,” given that “when
[Debtor] filed [for] chapter 7 bankruptcy . . . in January 2015, his assets
only totaled a little over $100,000.”160 Nor was Debtor’s testimony “that
he was spending lavishly and ‘living large’ after he entered into the
[franchise agreement] with H & R Block” satisfactory proof of the loss of
assets.161 “[S]uch general explanations, without documentation, [were]
not satisfactory” to meet Debtor’s burden of proof “to explain what hap-
pened to the assets.”162 As such, the bankruptcy court also denied dis-
charge on this basis as well as on several other grounds relating to the
Debtor’s other businesses and other property.163
As highlighted in In re Landin, it is important that debtors keep ade-
quate records not only after filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, but also
before. Despite the fact that exceptions to discharge are strictly construed
against a creditor, this case is a useful reminder that a bankruptcy dis-
charge is a privilege and can be revoked for failure to keep separate busi-
ness accounts and for failure to account for loss of assets.
154. Id. (citing Goff v. Russell Co. (In re Goff), 495 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1974)).
155. Id.




159. Id. at *10.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. (citing Chalik v. Moorefield (In re Chalik), 748 F.2d 616, 619 (11th Cir. 1984)
(per curium); First Tex. Sav. Ass’n, Inc. v. Reed (In re Reed), 700 F.2d 986, 993 (5th Cir.
1983)).
163. Id.
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VI. REMEDIES: DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
Colorado County Oil Co. v. Star Tex Distributors, Inc.,164 discussed
earlier for its tortious interference claims, addressed the evidence re-
quired to calculate lost profits as part of damages awarded to an injured
party. This case involved a ten-year dealer franchise agreement that cov-
ered the sale of gasoline by a gasoline distributor to a convenience
store.165 Under the agreement, the plaintiff agreed to provide “60,000
gallons of Citgo-branded gasoline [every] month for 10 years,” after
which the agreement would automatically renew unless terminated.166 In
the year the dealer franchise agreement was set to expire, CCO entered
into a similar ten-year contract with the convenience store for the sale of
a different-branded gasoline.167 After a series of communications be-
tween the distributor and CCO warning of interference with an existing
contract, the distributor eventually filed suit against CCO and the conve-
nience store.168 The jury found in favor of the distributor and awarded
damages from CCO as well as damages and attorney’s fees from the con-
venience store—which the defendants appealed.169
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals affirmed the damages
award against CCO for tortious interference.170 The distributor had of-
fered testimony of the approximate profit per gallon it received under the
dealer franchise agreement and multiplied it by the minimum number of
gallons (60,000) the convenience store was contractually obligated to
buy.171 CCO contested the approximation, arguing that the figure was
“unduly speculative” because it depended on so many variables such as
the economy, the cost of gasoline, and whether the distributor paid the
gasoline refiner’s invoice on time.172 In spite of CCO’s contention to the
contrary, the court of appeals held that the evidence presented was suffi-
cient to support the damages calculation offered by the distributor be-
cause “[r]ecovery for lost profits does not require that the loss be
susceptible of exact calculation.”173 At a minimum, this means that the
injured party must present objective facts to support any “opinions or
estimates” concerning damages to ensure that they are “reasonabl[y] cer-
tain[ ].”174 Thus, the distributor’s estimate of lost profits, which was based
164. No. 14-14-00905-CV, 2016 WL 2743452, at *11–12 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] May 10, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op).
165. Id. at *1.
166. Id.
167. Id. at *2–3.
168. Id. at *3.
169. Id. at *4.
170. Id. at *11–12; see also infra Part VI, Section D (discussing the damages awarded
from the convenience store).
171. Colo. Cty. Oil Co., 2016 WL 2743452, at *11.
172. Id.
173. Id. at *12 (quoting Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex.
1992)).
174. Id. (quoting Holt Atherton Indus., 835 S.W.2d at 84).
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on the history of sales to that convenience store and the minimum num-
ber of gallons it was contractually obligated to purchase from the distrib-
utor, was sufficient to meet this standard.175
Colorado County serves as an example of the threshold that an injured
party must meet to prove lost profits. Specifically, calculations offered
need not be exact but must still be based on figures that allow the jury to
reach a “reasonably certain” damage calculation. To this end, estimates
based on the specific sale history between the distributor and the reseller
seem key to offering a reasonable calculation that the court may uphold.
B. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Carduco, Inc., discussed earlier for its
fraud and misrepresentation claims, initially involved a jury award of
$115 million for punitive damages.176 The jury heard evidence that defen-
dant Mercedes-Benz had fraudulently induced the plaintiff into entering
franchise agreements; misrepresented facts concerning an existing Harlin-
gen dealership’s relocation to McAllen, Texas; and “failed to preserve
emails from potential witnesses” after learning of the plaintiff’s suit
(thereby earning a spoliation instruction).177 The jury found in the plain-
tiff’s favor and awarded plaintiff Carduco, Inc. $15.3 million in compensa-
tory damages and $115 million in punitive damages, which Mercedes-
Benz appealed.178
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals sided with Mercedes-Benz and
found the punitive damages award to be “unconstitutionally exces-
sive.”179 While Mercedes-Benz argued that the punitive damages award
was not justified “because there [was] no evidence of fraud or malice,”
the court soundly rejected this argument, referencing evidence of Merce-
des-Benz’s initial awareness and approval of the Harlingen dealership’s
relocation to McAllen and its later plans to add another dealership to
McAllen with the goal of terminating the Harlingen dealership.180 Be-
cause these attempts to “work around” the asset-purchase agreement
proved Mercedes-Benz’s intent to harm Carduco, the evidence supported
a finding of fraud and malice.181
Nonetheless, the court of appeals held that the punitive damages award
was “grossly excessive” and unconstitutional after reviewing the factors
that determine the constitutionality of a punitive damages award, namely
“(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the
175. Id.
176. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Carduco, Inc., No. 13-13-00296-CV, 2016 WL
1274535, at *3, *28 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 31, 2016) (mem. op.), judgment set
aside, opinion not vacated, No. 13-13-00296-CV, 2016 WL 4939377 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi Sept. 15, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
177. Id. at *2–12.
178. Id. at *3, *28.
179. Id. at *30.
180. Id. at *4–12, *28.
181. Id. at *28 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (West 2015) (al-
lowing exemplary damages with clear and convincing evidence of fraud or malice)).
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ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages awarded; and (3) the
difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and penal-
ties authorized or imposed in similar cases.”182 Of these factors, the rep-
rehensibility of the conduct is the most important and is further measured
by several factors, including whether “(1) the harm inflicted was physical
. . . ; (2) the tortious conduct showed an indifference to or reckless disre-
gard for the health or safety of others; (3) the target of the conduct was
financially vulnerable; (4) the conduct involved repeated . . . incident[s];
and (5) the harm . . . resulted from intentional malice.”183
The court of appeals found that four of these factors weighed in Merce-
des-Benz’s favor because the case involved a single incident of economic
harm that did not harm the health and safety of others and that targeted
an entity that was not financially vulnerable.184 At best, only the last fac-
tor weighed in Carduco’s favor, which was not sufficient to support a
finding of reprehensibility.185 Further, the ratio of compensatory to puni-
tive damages was 7.5 to 1—well above the 4-to-1 ratio that the Texas
Supreme Court has established as the constitutional limit.186 Finally, a
review of similar fraud cases and related criminal statutes indicated a
maximum fine of $10,000.187 While acknowledging that no “mathematical
bright line” for determining an exact and appropriate punitive damages
award exists, the court held that the punitive damages award was “grossly
excessive.”188 The appellate court proposed a remittur of $600,000, which
it eventually entered upon Carduco’s request.189
Mercedes-Benz serves as a reminder of the great scrutiny that large pu-
nitive damages awards face in Texas. Even in cases where the evidence of
intentional fraud or malice is overwhelming, a court may reject punitive
damages awards with a significant ratio to compensatory damages, espe-
cially if there is little to no evidence of physical harm, harm to the health
and safety of others, or repeated misconduct. While juries may dole out
such heavy-handed punishments to offending parties, appellate courts
seem less willing to support such excessive awards.
C. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
After granting the motion for summary judgment as to liability on all
claims, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas in
182. Id. at *29–30 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418
(2003); BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–80 (1996)).
183. See id. at *29 (citing Bennett v. Reynolds, 315 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Tex. 2010)).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. (citing Bennett, 315 S.W.3d at 873).
187. Id. at *29–30 (citing TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 12.34 (West 2011); State Farm, 538
U.S. at 418; Bennett, 315 S.W.3d at 873; Acadia Healthcare Co. v. Horizon Health Corp.,
472 S.W.3d 74, 97 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. granted); Bennett v. Reynolds, No.
03-05-00034-CV, 2010 WL 4670270, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 18, 2010, no pet.)
(mem. op.)).
188. Id. at *30 (quoting Bennett, 315 S.W.3d at 873).
189. Id.
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Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. Frontier Hotels, Inc. also held that a
permanent injunction against Frontier was warranted.190 To obtain per-
manent injunctive relief, Choice Hotels had to establish the following:
“(1) success on the merits; (2) that a failure to grant the injunction will
result in irreparable injury; (3) that said injury outweighs any damage
that the injunction will cause the opposing party; and (4) that the injunc-
tion will not disserve the public interest.”191 While Choice Hotels had
already succeeded on the merits of its claims, the district court easily
found in favor of Choice Hotels on all the remaining factors.192 Specifi-
cally, the district court pointed to the customer complaints and confusion
as evidence of irreparable injury.193 But even without such evidence, a
plaintiff can prove irreparable injury when there is a likelihood of confu-
sion merely by showing that it “lack[s] control over the quality of the
defendant’s goods or services . . . , regardless of the actual quality of those
goods or services.”194 The district court also held that any damage faced
by the defendants was negligible considering that Choice Hotels was suf-
fering “a loss of goodwill towards its business” and that “the injunction
simply require[d] . . . [compliance] with state and federal law[s].”195 Fur-
ther, a permanent injunction would actually serve the public interest by
eliminating the very use of infringing trademarks that confused
customers.196
Choice Hotels serves as an example of the evidence needed to success-
fully request a permanent injunction in franchise law cases involving
trademark infringement issues. More importantly, Choice Hotels reaf-
firms the rule in federal courts in the Southern District of Texas that,
when customer confusion is likely, a plaintiff’s lack of control over the
quality of the defendant’s goods or services is sufficient to establish an
irreparable harm, despite the actual quality of those goods or services.
Thus, franchisors might be able to obtain injunctive relief—even without
concrete evidence of irreparable injury—if they can show that confusion
is likely and that they are unable to control the quality of the franchisee’s
products.
D. ATTORNEYS’ FEES
In Colorado County Oil Co. v. Star Tex Distributors, Inc., discussed
earlier for its tortious interference claims and its compensatory damages
issues, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals upheld the grant of at-
torney’s fees from the convenience store because the evidence showed
190. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Frontier Hotels, Inc., No. H-15-2355, 2016 WL 4367993,
at *4–5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2016).
191. Id. at *4 (quoting VRC LLC v. City of Dallas, 460 F.3d 607, 611 (5th Cir. 2006)).
192. Id. at *4–5.
193. Id. at *4.
194. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Quantum Fitness Corp. v. Quantum LifeStyle Ctrs.,
L.L.C., 83 F. Supp. 2d 810, 831 (S.D. Tex. 1999)).
195. Id. at *4.
196. Id. at *5 (citing Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Patel, 940 F. Supp. 2d 532, 543 (S.D.
Tex. 2013); Quantum Fitness, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 832).
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that there was an enforceable contract and the distributor had met the
presentment requirement for claims.197 First, the convenience store ar-
gued that attorney’s fees should not have been awarded because there
was no enforceable contract.198 Specifically, the convenience store con-
tended that an enforceable contract did not exist because the distributor
had materially breached the dealer franchise agreement when it failed to
provide Citgo-branded gasoline and did not amend the agreement in
writing, thereby excusing the convenience store’s later breach.199 The
court rejected this argument, noting that the convenience store (1) non-
suited its counterclaim for breach of contract during the trial and (2)
failed to offer a specific objection or request to amend the jury charges to
include a question regarding the prior material breach.200 Moreover, the
evidence suggested that the alleged breach—i.e., the change in gasoline
brand provided by the distributor—was not actually material.201 Thus,
the court found that the convenience store did not preserve the issue on
appeal, and even if it had, the distributor’s breach was not material.202
Second, the convenience store argued that attorney’s fees had been im-
properly awarded because the distributor had not properly presented its
claim to the convenience store, as required by Section 38.002(2) of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.203 Essentially, “[t]he present-
ment requirement allows the party against whom the claim is asserted an
opportunity to tender performance without incurring an obligation for
attorney’s fees.”204 The party need not present the claim in any specific
form but may simply demand the opposing party’s performance.205 The
evidence indicated that while the distributor exchanged several communi-
cations with CCO, it never presented a notice or demand to the conve-
nience store regarding its improper termination of the dealer franchise
agreement.206 However, the distributor offered testimony that a distribu-
tor-representative visited the convenience store, mentioned the rumors of
branding changes, and advised the store: “I said, look, there is some obli-
gation there that you need to fulfill. . . . Fulfill that obligation. Before
[you] do anything, if I can help you, I’m willing to help you.”207 Although
197. Colo. Cty. Oil Co. v. Star Tex Distribs., Inc., No. 14-14-00905-CV, 2016 WL
2743452, at *4, *8–9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 10, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op).
198. Id. at *4.
199. Id. at *5–6.
200. Id. at *5–7.
201. Id. at *7–8.
202. Id.
203. Id. at *8 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.002(2) (West 2015)
(stating that, to recover attorney’s fees, the prevailing party “must present the claim to the
opposing party or to a duly authorized agent of the opposing party”)).
204. Id. (citing Gibson v. Cuellar, 440 S.W.3d 150, 157 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2013, no pet.)).
205. Id. (citing Gibson, 440 S.W.3d at 157).
206. Id. The alleged lack of presentment was even more pronounced given the conve-
nience store offered testimony that, at one point, the convenience store called the distribu-
tor to request that the Phillips-branded gasoline be removed because the store was
switching to Valero-branded gasoline. Id. at *3.
207. Id. at *9.
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the convenience store argued that these words only vaguely referenced its
contractual obligation, the court rejected this argument, finding that a
reasonable fact finder could conclude that these statements were suffi-
cient to meet the presentment requirement.208 For these reasons, the ap-
pellate court found that attorney’s fees had been properly awarded to the
distributor.209
Colorado County presents two important lessons in contesting an
award of attorney’s fees. First, a court is unlikely to overturn such an
award based on the lack of an enforceable contract if the issue has not
been preserved on appeal. Second, the threshold to meet the presentment
of claims requirement is not high. In fact, even an arguably vague refer-
ence to contractual obligations may be sufficient to meet the standard
and support an award of attorney’s fees, so long as a reasonable juror
could infer that a claim had been presented.
Similar to the Colorado County case, Yumilicious Franchise, LLC v.
Barrie, discussed earlier for its fraud and misrepresentation claims in
Yumilicious II, explored whether an award of attorney’s fees was justified
where a prevailing party allegedly failed to meet another procedural re-
quirement: segregation of fees.210 In that case, the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas awarded attorney’s fees to the franchisor-
plaintiff despite objections by the franchisee-defendants that the fees
should have been segregated.211 Franchisor Yumilicious sued franchisee
Why Not, L.L.C. and its guarantors for breach of the franchise agree-
ments and past-due payments for royalties and products.212 The defend-
ants counterclaimed, alleging, inter alia, that Yumilicious had fraudulently
induced them into entering the franchise agreements.213 After extensive
briefing on the matter, the district court granted summary judgment on
Yumilicious’s breach of contract claim and dismissed the defendants’
counterclaims—a ruling that was eventually affirmed by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.214 Yumilious then filed a motion to recover
attorney’s fees for the work performed by the two law firms it hired, and
the magistrate judge granted the majority of fees sought.215 The defend-
ants objected, arguing that Yumilicious sought fees that were “not rea-
sonable or necessary to the litigation of the contract claim,” but rather
were related to legal work performed in defending against the defend-
ants’ counterclaims.216 Accordingly, the defendants contended that
208. Id. (citing Criton Corp. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 809 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied)).
209. Id.
210. Yumilicious Franchise, LLC v. Barrie (Yumilicious III), No. 3:13-CV-4841-L, 2016
WL 6275203, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2016).
211. Id. at *1.
212. Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C. v. Barrie (Yumilicious II), 819 F.3d 170, 173 (5th
Cir. 2016).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 173–74, 179.
215. Yumilicious III, 2016 WL 6275203, at *1.
216. Id.
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Yumilicious should have segregated the fees devoted to challenging those
counterclaims.217
The district court disagreed with the defendants and affirmed the mag-
istrate judge’s findings regarding the reasonableness of hourly rates for
attorney’s fees in the Dallas legal market.218 More notably, the district
court clarified the rule for segregation of fees under Texas law, which
requires “the prevailing party to segregate out hours that were not rea-
sonable and necessary to prosecute claims on which that party pre-
vailed.”219 However, the district court recognized that there are
exceptions to this rule. Specifically, fee segregation is not required where
the plaintiff must defeat a counterclaim or affirmative defense to prevail
on its contract claim.220 In other words, because Yumilicious had to de-
feat the defendants’ counterclaims and affirmative defenses to win its
breach of contract claim, Yumilicious did not have to segregate its attor-
ney’s fees for the legal services performed in defeating those counter-
claims and affirmative defenses.221 The Yumilicious III holding clarifies
that a prevailing party can still collect attorneys’ fees without segregating
those fees in situations where defeat of counterclaims and affirmative de-
fenses was necessary to succeed on its claim.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Survey period included franchise cases covering a range of famil-
iar subject matters while also exploring the sufficiency of evidence re-
quired when faced with issues such as enforceable contract provisions,
vicarious liability, and remedies.
Among the procedural cases, Jani-King and Appliance Alliance reaf-
firm well-established rules regarding personal jurisdiction and the en-
forceability of forum selection clauses in franchise agreements.222 Jani-
King serves as a reminder that foreign entities seeking to avoid jurisdic-
tion in Texas should carefully review their actions when conducting busi-
ness in the state, as Texas courts consistently protect domestic entities
against foreign parties who avail themselves of the privilege of doing bus-
iness here. Meanwhile, the holding in Appliance Alliance indicates that
Texas courts will continue to enforce forum selection clauses contained in
franchise agreements in all but extremely rare cases.
The Rainbow decision developed the rules regarding forum selection
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at *2.
220. Id. (citing Varner v. Cardenas, 218 S.W.3d 68, 69 (Tex. 2007); Tony Gullo Motors I,
L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 314 (Tex. 2006)).
221. Id.
222. Appliance Alliance, LLC v. Sears Home Appliance Showrooms, LLC, No. 3:15-cv-
01707-M, 2015 WL 9319179 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2015); Jani-King Franchising, Inc. v. Falco
Franchising, S.A., No. 05-15-00335-CV, 2016 WL 2609314 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 5, 2016,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
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clauses in a different context: termination and settlement agreements.223
Although a party may intend that a subsequent settlement agreement su-
persede the entirety of an earlier termination agreement, a court may still
uphold provisions of the earlier agreement (such as a forum-selection
clause), depending on the language of the settlement agreement.224 Es-
sentially, Rainbow is a cautionary tale with an important drafting lesson:
subsequent agreements should explicitly identify whether specific provi-
sions or the entirety of a prior agreement are being replaced.
For arbitration clauses and class actions, White demonstrates how con-
sistently incorporating arbitration provisions into employment agree-
ments can prevent conditional class certification—even in cases where
only one of the employment agreements is produced as evidence.225 In
the category of intellectual property, Choice Hotels emphasizes the im-
portance of diligently protecting trademarks, especially after the termina-
tion of a franchise agreement.226
Waiver-of-reliance clauses, an important tool against fraud claims,
gained attention in both state and federal courts, as evidenced by
Yumilicious II and Mercedes-Benz.227 Yumilicious II illustrates that a
properly drafted waiver-of-reliance clause may be enforced if it expressly
disclaims the statement at issue.228 On the other hand, the court in Merce-
des-Benz refused to enforce a boilerplate waiver-of-reliance clause be-
cause the clause had not been negotiated and did not specifically disclaim
the matter at issue.229
There were also developments on the subject of vicarious liability in
franchise cases, as Barragan and Kye make clear.230 The Barragan deci-
sion indicates that the question of whether a franchisor is vicariously lia-
ble for the actions of a franchisee need not be decided at the pleadings
stage of a case because the existence of apparent agency is a question of
fact.231 But even once that question is broached, Kye demonstrates that
Texas courts will look to the actions of the franchisor—not the fran-
chisee—to determine whether apparent agency exists.232
223. Rainbow Int’l LLC v. Scruggs, No. W:15-CV-162, 2015 WL 11622491 (W.D. Tex.
Dec. 14, 2015).
224. See id. at *3–4.
225. See White v. Turner, No. H-15-1485, 2016 WL 1090107 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2016).
226. Choice Hotels Int’l v. Frontier Hotels, Inc., No. H-15-2355, 2016 WL 4367993, at
*3–4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2016).
227. Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C. v. Barrie (Yumilicious II), 819 F.3d 170, 178 (5th
Cir. 2016); Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Carduco, Inc., No. 13-13-00296-CV, 2016 WL
1274535, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 31, 2016) (mem. op.), set aside, opinion not
vacated, No. 13-13-00296-CV, 2016 WL 4939377 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Sept. 15, 2016,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
228. See Yumilicious II, 819 F.3d at 178.
229. Mercedes-Benz, 2016 WL 1274535, at *16.
230. See Barragan v. General Motors LLC, No. SA-15-CV-854-DAE, 2016 WL 3519675
(W.D. Tex. June 22, 2016); Won Kyu Kye v. New Star Realty, Inc., No. 05-15-00110-CV,
2016 WL 3523683 (Tex. App.—Dallas, June 27, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
231. Barragan, 2016 WL 3519675, at *9.
232. Kye, 2016 WL 3523683, at *5.
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In addition to its contribution on the subject of waiver-of-reliance
clauses, Yumilicious II—a case that proved to be as significant in 2016 as
it was in the previous year—carries several useful reminders with regard
to other evidentiary standards for substantive claims.233 First, Yumilicious
II reiterates that the economic loss rule can be applied against a negligent
misrepresentation claim (though not against a fraudulent inducement
claim).234 Second, this case restates the rule that the party with the bur-
den of proof must provide concrete evidence of false statements or omis-
sions at summary judgment (i.e., pleadings alone are insufficient).235
Third, the Yumilicious II holding reaffirms that technical violations of the
Franchise Rule are not sufficient to support a DTPA claim.236
As for bankruptcy claims, In re Landin highlights the importance of
keeping adequate records even before filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.237
This holding could be useful to a future court reviewing a bankruptcy
discharge where the debtor failed to keep separate business accounts and
records for loss of assets.
In the context of remedies, Colorado County provides guidance on evi-
dentiary standards for compensatory damages as well as attorney’s
fees.238 Namely, calculations of lost profits need not be exact but should
be based on estimates that relate to the specific contract between the
parties.239 Further, the presentment of claims may be proven by arguably
vague references to contractual obligations.240 Choice Hotels is notable
again for its grant of a permanent injunction in the absence of concrete
evidence of irreparable injury. The Choice Hotels decision indicates that
obtaining injunctive relief may be possible where the party cannot control
the quality of its product and where confusion is likely.241 Finally, the
Yumilicious III case holds that the segregation of fees is not necessary
where counterclaims and affirmative defenses must be defeated for a
plaintiff to succeed on its own claims.242
233. Yumilicious II, 819 F.3d at 178.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 176.
237. See Robbins v. Landin (In re Landin), No. 15-50148-CAG, 2016 WL 3049626
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. May 20, 2016).
238. Colo. Cty. Oil Co. v. Star Tex Distribs., Inc., No. 14-14-00905-CV, 2016 WL
2743452, at *8–9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 10, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. Choice Hotels Int’l v. Frontier Hotels, Inc., No. H-15-2355, 2016 WL 4367993, at
*4–5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2016).
242. Yumilicious Franchise, LLC v. Barrie (Yumilicious III), No. 3:13-CV-4841-L, 2016
WL 6275203, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2016).
